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I. Introduction 
Operational risk management in financial institutions has undoubtedly attracted more 
attention from the regulators, practitioners, and also academics over the last decade. One of 
the reasons is because of the huge losses incurred by a number of financial institutions such 
as Barings, Daiwa and Merril Lynch, due to the malfunctioning of their operational risk 
management (Hoffman, 2002; Hull, 2007; Hussain, 2000). Having learnt the lessons from 
the current financial failures, regulators and practitioners have, therefore, seriously taken the 
issue. In spite of the wide range of areas and issues in operational risks that need to be catered, 
attempts to define and classify operational risk have been made by several institutions, most 
notably by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which proposed a definition of 
operational risk through its consultative document on operational risk (BCBS, 2001). 
The industry has a wide range of responses to the definition proposed by BCBS. Despite 
the criticisms received from the industry, a positive side of the proposal is that banks started 
to realise the importance of managing operational risk, and therefore started to put aside a 
certain percentage of capital for operational risk, in addition to credit and market risk. 
In Islamic banking industry, the need to cater operational risk issue has also been 
discussed by Akkizidis and Kumar (2008), Archer and Haron (2007), Hossain (2005), Iqbal 
and Mirakhor (2007), Khan and Ahmed (2001), and Sundararajan and Errico (2002). It does 
not come as a surprise since Islamic banks operate in a similar, if not the same, business 
environment. Khan and Ahmed (2001) show that operational risk is relatively higher and 
serious than credit risk and market risk for Islamic banks. Unfortunately, there has not 
been any single literature which thoroughly tackles the issue. This may be due to the fact 
that operational risk carries complexities and it is relatively new area which calls for more 
academic inquiry. This is the reason from which this paper is developed. 
The paper starts with a discussion on the nature and origin of an Islamic bank 
and analyse why an Islamic bank has a distinct operational aspect, as compared to the 
conventional one. It also attempts to examine the operational risk exposures in Islamic 
banks. The following section discusses how to identify and conduct a mapping of operational 
risk in Islamic banks, which are also different from conventional ones on the structure of 
their financial contracts. Thus, they bring different features of operational risks in different 
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contracts. This is the issue which is discussed in the subsequent sections. The analysis would 
not have been complete without tackling the issue of having adequate capital in order to cover 
operational losses. Finally, the last section presents the concluding remarks. 
II. Nature and Origin of Islamic Banks 
The way financial system is set up can be very central for efficient resource allocation. History 
has shown that the financial system is determined by the nature of financial intermediation. 
The rapid development in financial system has made financial intermediary more important 
in the economy. The acquisition and processing of information about economic agents, the 
packaging and repackaging of financial claims, and financial contracting are among the 
activities that differentiate financial intermediation from other economic activities (Mishkin, 
2004). The nature of intermediation has changed drastically over the last three decades due to 
the changes in macroeconomic policies, liberalisation of capital accounts, deregulation, and 
advances in financial theory as well as breakthroughs in technology. Lending based operations 
which characterise traditional banking activity has been replaced by more fee-based services 
that bring investors and borrowers directly in contact with each other. Financial intermediation 
in the form of traditional banking—mainly based on the operations of lending—has declined 
considerably in developed countries where market-based intermediation has become 
dominant. 
In Islamic history, financial intermediation has established a historical record and 
has made significant contributions to economic development over time. The simplest 
manifestation of financial services within the early Muslim states took the form of money-
changers (Sayarifah; sing., Sairafi) who were also partially engaged in the holding of deposits 
and the short-term financing of trade (Chapra and Khan, 2000). Yet a more sophisticated 
form of banking finance for trade and government was represented by the Jahabidhah (sing., 
Jahbadh) who practiced much of the modern financing activities under the supervision of 
the Muslim state (Chachi, 2005; Heck, 2006). In the highly developed market economy of 
the Abbasid State, Jahabidhah bankers proliferated throughout the state, even though they 
were mostly of Jews who enjoyed the status of Ahl al-Kitab origin (People of the Book) 
within the early Muslim state. The Jahabidhah were basically trade vendors who concurrently 
practiced business of financing and commercial transactions to others. Banking operations 
were therefore ancillary to primary mercantile operations, yet they seemed to have grown 
to sizeable banking functions particularly when the Jahabidhah accepted deposits in efforts 
to augment their own businesses. The high streets of Basra were so much supplied with 
money-changers and Jahabidhah that the banking network in Basra was rightly called by a 
Western historian ‘the Wall-Street of the Middle Ages’ (Heck, 2006). The famous Persian 
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historian, Nasir-i Khusraw, was reported to have estimated the number of Jahabidhah 
bankers in the state of Isfahan alone at 200 financial institutions (Heck, 2006). It was such a 
complex network of banking activities that the call for appropriate government supervision 
and regulation was acknowledged by the Islamic state. To this effect, the Abbasid State 
established a central banking agency in year 316 H/ 929 A.D called Diwan al-Jahabidhah to 
foresee the performance and growth of banks within the empire. A similar central bank was 
established in Egypt by the Fatimid State by the name Dar al-Mal in the commercial capital 
of al-Fustat to supervise an equally intense Jahabidhah banking activity in Fatimid Egypt. 
Among the most commonly practiced banking instruments were the Sakk (the Arabic root 
of ‘cheque’) and the Suftajah (which combined features of traveller cheques and letters of 
credit), the Hawalah (which is a means credit transfer), Wadi’ah (i.e. deposit), Ruq’ah (which 
was a sort of promissory note). The use of cheque (Sakk) was particularly known since the 
time of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. A renowned historian, Ibn Abdel-Hakam, reported that 
Umar ibn al-Khattab paid for the grains delivered to the state warehouses by cheque and that 
he used to pay government wages by cheques signed by his treasurer Zaid ibn Thabit (Heck, 
2006).
The existence of an Islamic bank in the present days, hence, is believed to be a modern 
transformation of Jahbadh (Chachi, 2005; Chapra and Khan, 2000; Heck, 2006). As a matter 
of fact, such transformation started to materialise in Mit Ghamr, Egypt from 1963 to 1967 
when there was an initiative by Mit Ghamr Savings Bank to mobilise small savings from 
the rural sector largely through savings account without any interest payment to the account 
holders. It was followed by the establishment of Nasser Social Bank in 1971, Dubai Islamic 
Bank and Islamic Development Bank as the first international Islamic financial institution in 
1975. Moreover, Islamic banking industry witnessed a very rapid growth surpassing US$ 100 
billion worth during 1980–1990 (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005: 64).  
Having been regarded as an alternative financial intermediary with profit and loss 
sharing contract (in Mudarabah and Musharakah contract) as its cornerstone, an Islamic bank 
is, theoretically, expected to bring more stabilisation and efficiency in resource allocation. 
In addition to that, an Islamic bank is also equipped with contracts which may, slightly, look 
similar to what a conventional bank has been commonly practising; i.e. debt financing (in 
Murabahah contract). Nevertheless, the nature of debt in an Islamic bank is qualitatively 
different from that of conventional bank since debt contract in an Islamic bank requires to be 
tied to some underlying assets (Ahmed, 2005 and Khan, 1995). Furthermore, a debt contract 
in Islamic financing scheme is not a Riba-based contract, in contrast with the concept of a 
debt contract in conventional perspective. Consequently, the distinctive contractual structure 
that an Islamic bank embodies necessitates different treatment on the management of the 
operational system of an Islamic bank. 
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III. Operational Risk Exposures in Islamic Banks
As a modern form of Jahbadh, an Islamic bank is an institution offering financial services 
which conforms with Shariah. A set of shariah principles governing the operations of Islamic 
banks are (i) prohibition of dealing with interest (Riba); (ii) financial contracts must be cleared 
from contractual uncertainty (Gharar); (iii) exclusion of gambling (Maysir) in any financial 
activity; (iv) profit must not be originated from Haram economic and financial activities 
(prohibited industries such as those related to pork products, pornography, or alcoholic 
beverages); (v) each financial transaction must refer to a tangible, identifiable underlying 
asset; and (vi) parties to a financial transaction must share in the risks and rewards attached to 
it. The principles mentioned above must be, conceptually, inherent in Islamic banks, in order 
to distinguish them from conventional banks. 
With regard to operational risk, Islamic banks face the same challenges as conventional 
ones, to the extent that they offer financial services in various banking activities (Archer and 
Haron, 2007; and Hossain, 2005). At this state, the challenge is fairly similar for all financial 
intermediaries, whether Shariah-compliant or not. Nevertheless, the challenges are more 
sophisticated for Islamic banks since the financial activities and the features of the financial 
contracts are substantially different. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) clearly mentions 
in its publication that Islamic banks are exposed to “a range of operational risks that could 
materially affect their operations” (IFSB, 2007a: 22). Further, it is argued that operational 
risks are likely to be more significant for Islamic banks due to their specific contractual 
features (Fiennes, 2007; Greuning and Iqbal, 2008; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Khan and 
Ahmed, 2001; Kumar, 2008; Sundararajan and Errico, 2002; Sundararajan, 2005). 
Unlike the Basel 2’s definition on operational risk which states “operational risk is 
the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people or system, or 
from external events” (BCBS, 2001: 2); in Islamic banks, operational risk is associated with 
the loss resulting from “inadequate or failed internal processes, people and system, or from 
external events, including losses resulting from Shariah non compliance and the failure in 
fiduciary responsibilities” (IFSB, 2005a: 26). It is understood that the definition of operational 
risk in Islamic banks entails legal risk (Archer and Haron, 2007; Cihak and Hesse, 2008; 
Djojosugito, 2008, Fiennes, 2007; Khan and Ahmed, 2001; Sundararajan, 2005), and also 
reputational risk (Fiennes, 2007; Akkizidis and Kumar, 2008; Standard & Poor’s, 2008). The 
foremost distinctive feature of this definition, as compared to the definition by Basel 2, is the 
inclusion of Shariah non-compliance risk and fiduciary risk. As a matter of fact, Shariah non-
compliance risk is considered to have a significant portion in operational risk (IFSB, 2007b: 6). 
Shariah non-compliance risk is the risk arising from Islamic banks’ failure to comply 
with the Shariah rules and principles determined by the Shariah Board or the relevant body in 
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the jurisdiction in which the Islamic bank operates (IFSB, 2005a). The failure to comply with 
such principle will result in the transaction being cancelled, and hence the income or loss can 
not be recognised. Moreover, fiduciary risk is the risk that arises from Islamic banks’ failure 
to perform in accordance with explicit and implicit standards applicable to their fiduciary 
responsibilities (IFSB, 2005a). 
Therefore, a failure in maintaining fiduciary responsibilities will result in the 
deterioration of Islamic banks’ reputation (Hamidi, 2006). A reputational damage could 
eventually cause a withdrawal of funds which would result in a liquidity crisis. It could also 
make customers stop requesting financing from Islamic banks, triggering a downturn in 
profitability. Therefore, in order to keep good reputation, it is suggested that Islamic banks 
need to do two things; firstly, to ensure that their financial products are Shariah compliant 
(Greuning and Iqbal, 2008; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007), secondly, to effectively maintain their 
fiduciary roles (Muljawan, 2005).
The spotlight above explains why operational risk management in Islamic banks is not 
similar to that in conventional banks. There are a number of dimensions need to be added in 
the analysis. Although it is argued earlier that the challenges are somewhat similar, they are 
only to the extent that Islamic banks and conventional banks are dealing with various banking 
activities. To a greater extent, operational risk management in Islamic banking requires more 
thorough understanding of the sources of operational risk from which the loss could occur. It 
is, therefore, proposed that operational risk exposures in Islamic banks could appear based on 
the following major sources: (i) Shariah non-compliance risk; (ii) fiduciary risk; (iii) people 
risk; (iv) technology risk, and (v) legal risk.
3.1 Shariah Compliance Risk 
IFSB guiding principles of risk management for institutions offering Islamic financial 
services—other than insurance institutions, clearly mentions the definition of Shariah non-
compliance risk. It is the risk which arises from “IIFSs’1 failure to comply with the Shariah 
rules and principles determined by the Shariah board of the IIFS or the relevant body in the 
jurisdiction in which the IIFS operate” (IFSB, 2005a: 26). For Islamic banks, to be Shariah 
compliant is paramount. According to IFSB Principle 7.1, Islamic banks shall have in place 
adequate system and controls, including Shariah Board/Advisor, to ensure compliance with 
Shariah rules and principles (IFSB, 2005a: 27). Such compliance requirements must be 
pervasively infused throughout the organisation as well as in their products and activities. 
Shariah compliance is considered by IFSB as a higher priority in relation to the other 
1 IIFS stands for institutions (other than insurance companies) which offer only Islamic financial 
services. In many literatures, the term ”Islamic banks”, “IIFS” or “Islamic financial institutions” are used 
interchangeably. IFSB opts to use IIFS in its publication. 
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identified risks, since violation of Shariah principles will result in the transactions being 
cancelled or income generated from them shall be considered as illegitimate. 
The need to ensure compliance with Shariah in operational risk management is vital (Aziz, 
2006) and it must encompass the products, activities, and contract documentation—with regard 
to formation, termination and elements which might possibly affect contract performance 
such as fraud and misrepresentation. Furthermore, the degree of Shariah compliance, as IFSB 
(2005a) suggests, has to be reviewed, at least, annually which can be performed by a credible 
party, either from a separate Shariah control department or as part of the existing internal and 
external audit. The main objective is to ensure that (a) the nature of Islamic banks’ financing 
and equity investment; and (b) their operations are executed in adherence to the Shariah 
principles. 
In the event that Shariah non compliance occurs, either in the products or activities, 
Islamic banks need to keep record of the profits out of it. The record will help Islamic banks 
assess the probability of similar cases arising in the future. Further, historical reviews and 
data of potential areas of Shariah non-compliance will enable Islamic banks to make an 
assessment on the potential profits which can not be recognised as legitimate profits. In order 
word, potential loss could be managed, hence, reduced to a minimum level. 
With respect to Shariah requirements in financing contracts, albeit the diversity of 
interpretations prevalent in the industry, Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has already issued its latest Shariah standard  that could be 
referred to by Islamic banks. In sum, Shariah compliant financing—in six different contracts, 
needs to fulfil the following shariah requirements (AAOIFI, 2005): 
(a) Murabahah and Ijarah contracts: 
• The asset is in existence at the time of sale or lease or, in Ijarah, the lease 
contract should be preceded by acquisition of the usufruct of the leased asset;
• The asset is legally owned by Islamic banks when it is sold;
• The asset is intended to be used by the buyer/lessee for activities or business 
permissible by Shariah; if the asset is leased back to its owner in the first lease 
period, it should not lead to contract of ‘Inah, by varying the rent or the duration; 
• In the event of late payment, there is no penalty fee or increase in price in 
exchange for extending or rescheduling the date of payment of accounts receivable 
or lease receivable, irrespective of whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent. 
(b) Salam and Istisna’ contracts:  
• A sale and purchase contract cannot be inter-dependent and inter-conditional on 
each other. This is for the case of Salam and parallel Salam or Istisna’ and parallel 
Istisna’;
• It is not allowed to stipulate a penalty clause in respect of delay in delivery of 
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a commodity that is purchased under Salam contract. However, it is allowed under 
Istisna’ or parallel Istisna’;
• The subject matter of an istisna’ contract may not physically exist upon 
entering into the contract.
(c) Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts:  
• The capital of the Islamic banks is to be invested in Shariah compliant 
investments or business activities; 
• A partner in Musharakah cannot guarantee the capital of another partner or a 
mudarib guarantees the capital of the Mudarabah;
• The purchase price of other partner’s share in a musharakah with a binding 
promise to purchase can only be set as per the market value or as per the agreement 
at the date of buying. It is not permissible to stipulate that the share be acquired at 
its face value.    
Clearly, it is vital for Islamic banks to abide by the Shariah principles in every aspect of their 
financial transactions. In addition to that, the process of structuring the contracts is also very 
important. In other word, sequence in structuring certain financial products could determine 
the degree of Shariah compliance, since a few contracts could be used as legal devices to 
circumvent certain Shariah principles. 
   
3.2 Fiduciary Risk 
Islamic banks are liable for losses arising from their negligence, misconduct or breach of 
their investment mandate; the risk of losses which arises from such events is characterised 
as a fiduciary risk. In other word, fiduciary risk is an indication of failure to “perform in 
accordance with explicit and implicit standards applicable to their fiduciary responsibilities” 
(IFSB, 2005a: 26). The indication of such failure can be seen from the high degree of their 
earnings volatility. As a result of losses, Islamic banks may become insolvent and as a 
consequence unable to (a) meet the demands of current account holders for repayment of their 
funds, or (b) protect the interests of its investment account holders.
In performing their fiduciary role, Islamic banks are enforced to preserve the interests of 
all fund providers, as prescribed by IFSB standard on risk management principle 7.2 (IFSB, 
2005a: 2). In doing so, Islamic banks must ensure that the bases for “asset, revenue, expense 
and profit allocations are established, applied and reported in a manner consistent with Islamic 
banks’ fiduciary responsibilities” (IFSB, 2005a: 27).
Islamic banks’ fiduciary duty is all about preserving the trust from all fund providers. 
Two important aspects that seriously need to be taken into consideration in safeguarding the 
trust are: 
(a) Shariah aspect: Islamic banks must ensure that the activities and the products are Shariah-
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compliance; 
(b) Performance aspect: Islamic banks are required to have sound financial performance, 
without which, fund providers might indicate that there is mismanagement or misconduct.  
In the Shariah aspect, Islamic banks may follow the guidance set by their own or 
independent Shariah supervisory board; while in the performance aspect Islamic banks may 
create policy which includes the following: 
• A proper identification of Shariah compliant and profitable investment 
activities which can contribute to a stable investment returns;   
• An efficient allocation of assets and profits should be managed professionally 
and in accordance with an Islamic bank’s fiduciary responsibilities;
• A regular information provision of the investment performance is necessary for 
the investment account holders and the market in order to assess the  risk profiles 
and the financial soundness of the Islamic banks. 
The element of trust is very important in the relationship between Islamic banks and the 
fund providers. This relationship, as Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) argue, differentiates Islamic 
banks from conventional ones and is the sole justification for the existence of the Islamic 
banks. Thus, Islamic banks are always expected to act in the best interests of their fund 
providers, i.e. investors/depositors and shareholders. In respect with fiduciary role, Islamic 
banks are exposed to fiduciary risk if they fail to align the objectives of the investors and 
shareholders with the actions that they are supposed to carry out. 
The consequences of fiduciary risk can be enormous, particularly if Islamic banks 
start to loose their reputation from their customers. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) argue that 
fiduciary risk can give a huge impact on the bank’s cost and access to liquidity. If the banks 
are declared to be insolvent, which is the worst case, the banks are unlikely able to meet the 
demands of the current and investment account holders. Hence, a sound level of solvability 
help Islamic banks enhances their credibility in sights of the fund provider. In this respect, 
Muljawan (2005) suggests three numerical indicators which can possibly used to indicate 
the level of a bank’s solvency; first, capital adequacy ratio (CAR) based on IFSB directives; 
second, equity coverage ratio which reflects the capability of the own capital to effectively 
cover the potential loss emanated from bank’s financial exposures; and third, leverage ratio 
that indicates the estimate of the residual claims of the bank. 
A few cases of fiduciary risk exposures that could occur in Islamic banks are as follows 
(Greuning and Iqbal, 2008; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007): 
• In Mudarabah and Musharakah contracts on the assets side of the balance sheet 
for instance; the bank is expected to perform adequate screening and monitoring 
of projects. Any deliberate or non-deliberate negligence which lead to fiduciary 
risk should also be monitored. It is, nevertheless, imperative for the management to 
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perform due diligence before taking actions on the investors/depositors’ funds. 
• Mismanagement of current account holders’ funds can expose the bank to 
fiduciary risk as well. It might occur when Islamic banks are suffering heavy losses 
when utilising such funds which could result in the depositors losing confidence in 
the bank. 
• Inflicting expenses or allocation of excessive expenses to investment account 
holders is a breach of the implicit contract to act in a transparent fashion.
A good reputation is, without doubt, determined by how thorough Islamic banks 
maintain their fiduciary roles. Although reputational risk is perceived to be part of operational 
risk (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007), this paper argues that reputational 
risk is, as a matter of fact, a resulting impact of the failure in maintaining fiduciary roles.
3.3 People Risk 
People risk is another type of operational risk arising from incompetence or fraud, which 
exposes Islamic banks to potential losses. This includes human errors, lack of expertise, and 
fraud (Akkizidis and Kumar, 2008). Another aspect which has to be taken into consideration 
is that whether the risk of a loss is intentional or unintentional. Unfortunately, as Akkizidis 
and Kumar (2008) contend, the largest amount of losses comes from intentional activities 
such as fraud and unauthorised trading. For instance, an internal control problem cost the 
Dubai Islamic Bank US$50 million in 1998 when a bank official did not conform to the 
bank’s credit terms. This also resulted in a run on its deposits of US$138 million, representing 
7% of the bank’s total deposits, in just one day (Warde, 2000: 155). Another case involving 
a large unauthorised loan, around US$242 million, was also caused by bank official of the 
Dubai Islamic Bank and West African tycoon Foutanga Dit Babani Sissoko (Warde, 2000: 
156).
Although there has not been any single research assessing the exposure of people risk in 
Islamic banks, as mentioned earlier, it is understood that the challenge is considerably high. 
The thriving development of Islamic banking industry, unfortunately, has not been matched up 
with the number of people who have credentials in running and directing the business.  This 
issue has been highlighted by Aziz (2006), Edwardes (2002), Jackson-Moore (2007), Khan 
(2004), Khan and Ahmed (2001), and Kumar (2008), and Nienhaus (2007). The dimension 
of people risk in Islamic banks is understandably wider than in conventional ones since the 
personnel of Islamic banks’ personnel are required to be well-versed in both, conventional 
banking products and their status in relation to Islamic requirements (Aziz, 2006; Ebrahim, 
2007; Nienhaus, 2007). There is a dire need that Islamic banking industry must be equipped 
with a new breed of innovators, risk managers, regulators and supervisors who have the right 
blend of knowledge of finance and the understanding of the Shariah (Aziz, 2006).
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Furthermore, they should be aware of the existing Islamic alternatives and their 
commercial advantages and disadvantages compared to the conventional products (Nienhaus, 
2007). A shortage in skilled bankers with such requirements aforementioned above, will 
undoubtedly lead to a higher people risk (Jackson-Moore, 2007). In other word, inadequately 
trained staff or incapable personnel will expose Islamic banks unnecessarily to operational 
risk. In response to a very demanding industry, staffs of Islamic banks must be able to design 
Shariah compliant financial innovations in order to meet the diversified needs of the clients 
and to match the ever increasing scope of conventional techniques, procedures, and products. 
More importantly, despite the fact of such challenges, staffs of Islamic banks should be able 
to create financial contracts which are more than just legally interest free. In other words, 
skilled staffs of Islamic banks will ensure that the products are efficient as well as Shariah-
compliant. Unskilled staffs can cause the product to be, either illegitimate according to 
Shariah or inefficient.
A fraud case in the Dubai Islamic Bank as mentioned above shows that an institution 
called Islamic bank is not free from fraud, whether intentional or unintentional. Akkizidis 
and Kumar (2008) suggest that financial institutions should establish appropriate system and 
thorough control for the management of operational risks that may arise from employee. 
Hence, the following direction can be established (Akkizidis and Kumar, 2008: 194–195):  
• A selection of employees that respect and follow the Shariah principles;
• A separation of the employees’ duties; 
• An internal supervision of the employees’ performances; 
• Well established policies that are complying with the Shariah principles and 
are well known by all employees;
• Training process to direct the employees in the process of the risk management;
• A transparent reward and punishment mechanism.
At the current state, it is understood that people risk can contribute to operational risks 
substantially. One of the reasons is because of the lack of people who are adequately trained 
in both modern financial transactions and applied Fiqh Muamalah. In most cases, Islamic 
banks hire Shariah scholars who hardly understand the complexity of modern financial 
transactions. On the other hand, it is also very difficult to find financial economists who are 
knowledgeable in applied Fiqh Muamalah.
3.4 Technology Risk
In an advanced financial industry, an Islamic bank’s operations are very much dependent 
on its technological system. Its success depends, in great part, on its ability to assemble 
increasingly rich databases and make timely decisions in anticipation of client demands and 
industry changes. The advanced use of information technology (IT) has also brought a new 
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facet in the current competition of Islamic banking industry. It is often that a success of an 
Islamic bank’s business is determined by the ability to capitalise the use of an information 
technology in different ways. An inability to keep up with the advanced use of an information 
technology could cause an Islamic bank fall behind its competitors. Therefore, every Islamic 
bank must be committed to an ongoing process of upgrading, enhancing, and testing its 
technology, to effectively meet (Chorafas, 2004: 91); (a) sophisticated client requirements, 
(b) market and regulatory changes, and (c) evolving internal needs for information and 
knowledge management.
Chorafas (2004) argues that a failure to respond to the above prerequisites could 
increase an exposure to operational risk related to IT. In addition, the use of software and 
telecommunications systems that are not tailored to the need of Islamic banks could also 
contribute to technology risk, as well as many other internal such as such as human error, 
internal fraud through software manipulation (Chorafas, 2004: 91), programming errors, 
IT crash caused by new applications, incompatibility with the existing systems, failures of 
system to meet the business requirements (Akkizidis and Kumar, 2008: 191), external fraud 
by intruders; obsolescence in applications and machines, reliability issues, mismanagement, 
and the effect of natural disasters. 
It is clear from the explanation above that the extensive use of an information technology 
could increase IT related operational risk in number and severity originating from internal as 
well as external events. 
However, high technology allows a visualisation which turns numbers into graphs and 
images. Unfortunately, only few financial institutions have the ability to capitalise the best 
that the technology can offer (Chorafas, 2004). Spending big sums of money on technology 
without the corresponding return on investment (ROI) is also an indication of an IT-related 
operational risk.  
3.5 Legal Risk 
The inclusion of legal risk as part of a broader notion of operational risk has been a subject of 
debate among the academicians and practitioners (Hadjiemmanuil, 2003; Scott, 2001). This 
might be due to the difficulties in defining its nature (Scott, 2001). The other reason, as Scott 
(2001) argues, is because legal risk has an unpredictable effect, even though it can be the 
determinant of losses that banks have to incur. Integrating legal risk as a subset of operational 
risk is also criticised because of being neither self-evident nor universally accepted 
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2003). 
Confusion on the subject matter also revolves around the various meanings of the term 
legal risk, which also depends on the specific context and the practical concerns of the persons 
employing it (Hadjiemmanuil, 2003). Furthermore, Hadjiemmanuil (2003) suggests that there 
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are different ways in which loss may arise, all of which are often classified under the domain 
of legal risk. Thus, the loss may be attributable to:  
(a) Legally flawed actions of the bank or its employees and agents; as a result of which the 
bank either incurs direct liabilities or becomes unable to ascertain in law a certain right in 
order to protect its interests; 
(b) Legal uncertainty; this is an external parameter which does not depend on any fault of 
the bank itself. It affects even the most diligently and prudently run institutions. Sometimes, 
the law is intentionally expressed in general and abstract terms. Because of informational 
constraints, it is impossible to draft complete rules which make special provision for each and 
every eventuality; 
(c) Legal uncertainties and financial innovation. Innovation, however, is a significant 
contributor to legal risk as well. The adoption of new and complex transactional techniques, 
in particular, often comes with significant legal uncertainty, hence, can expose banks to 
potentially catastrophic risk; 
(d) Country specific legal perils and costs. The term legal risk can also refer to the relative 
risk of doing business in different countries, as a function of the quality of their legal system. 
Jurisdictions can be compared by reference to the effects of their laws and judicial systems in 
terms of increasing or attenuating the risk. 
With respect to Islamic banking, the impacts of legal risk on Islamic banks are 
substantial and cannot be neglected (Cihak and Hesse, 2008; Djojosugito, 2008; Hassan and 
Dicle, 2005; Iqbal, 2005; Kahf, 2005; Kumar, 2008; Nienhaus, 2005; Sundararajan, 2005). 
Legal risk may arise from uncertainty in laws (Kumar, 2008), lack of reliable legal system 
to enforce financial contracts (Djojosugito, 2008; Iqbal, 2005; Sundararajan and Errico, 
2002; Sundararajan, 2005), legal uncertainty in the interpretations of contracts (Cihak and 
Hesse, 2008), the legality of financial instruments (Djojosugito, 2008), lack of availability of 
legal experts (Kumar 2008), and exposure to unanticipated changes in laws and regulations 
(Djojosugito, 2008). Moreover, it is argued that some operational aspects of Islamic banking 
activities are not sufficiently covered by laws, which in turn, results in the exposure of legal 
risk to Islamic banks (Djojosugito, 2008). It stems from the fact that most of Islamic banks, at 
the current stage, operate within similar legal and business environments (Hassan and Dicle, 
2005; Kahf, 2005). In addition to that, a number of inevitable separate contracts in Islamic 
banking products could contribute to additional legal risks (PWC, 2009). For example, in the 
case of Murabaha transaction, the bank has to buy an item and then sell it on under different 
payment terms—each step takes time and involves a fresh contractual agreement which 
magnifies the scope for disagreements and complications.
Uncertainty in regulation may also account for legal risk if such regulatory changes 
affect the legality of certain Islamic financial instruments. This is the case in Indonesia where 
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the law views some of Mudarabah bonds issued as debt which in effect is guaranteed by the 
patrimony of Mudarib (Djojosugito, 2008). While Shariah prohibits such recourse, the law 
will not uphold the Shariah prohibition.
IV. Identification of Operational Risks
The wide scope of operational risk has inescapably created difficulties in the analysis of 
operational risk management. Thus it is not easy to develop a workable classification scheme 
or taxonomy for this type of risk. The following figure will help us identify the source of 
operational risk based on five categories; (1) nature of the risk, (2) impact of the risk, (3) 
degree of expectancy, (4) the frequency  & magnitude (severity) of loss,  and (5) hazards, 
events, and consequences type.
Figure 1: Classification of Operational Risk
Source: Marshall (2001), with modifications
4.1 Nature of the Risk 
Following the categorisation set out by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, internally 
inflicted operational risks are any intended acts to defraud, misappropriate property or 
circumvent regulations, law, or company policy. This includes intentional misreporting of 
positions, employee theft, and insider trading on an employee’s own account (BCBS, 2002). 
In addition to that, a failure to comply with Shariah principles and inability to maintain the 
fiduciary responsibilities are the operational risk which originates from within the management 
of the bank. Other internal risks may result from technology risk due to the programming 
errors, IT crash caused by new application, or the incompatibility contractual features and the 
technology installed in the system (Akkizidis and Kumar, 2008). The process of conducting 
the business, as Zamorski (2003) contends, also matters. For an Islamic bank, an appropriate 
process in structuring the financial products is certainly crucial. It is worth noting that the 
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sequence of structuring the product, which includes the delivery or an execution, can determine 
whether the financial products are in accordance with Shariah principles or not. 
Furthermore, externally inflicted operational risks may arise from incidents such as 
external fraud, theft, computer hacking, regulatory regime change, and other factors which are 
beyond the control of an Islamic bank. 
Many of the internal operational risk can be prevented with an appropriate internal 
management practices; for example, tightened controls and management of the personnel 
that can help prevent some employee errors and internal fraud, and also an improved 
telecommunication network which can help prevent some technological failures. However, 
external operational risks are rather difficult to prevent. Marshall (2001), Young and Ashby 
(2001), van den Brink (2002) and Hoffman (2002) contend that it is still possible to design 
insurance or other hedging strategies to reduce or possibly eliminate externally inflicted losses.
4.2 Impact of the Risk 
Direct risk is any risk leading to losses directly arises from the associated events. For example, 
in incompetent currency trader can result in a loss for the bank due to adverse exchange rate 
movements. Another example might be by mistakenly charging in the amount of £10,000 instead 
of £15,000 resulting in the loss for the bank in the amount of £5,000. The Basel II sets guidelines 
regarding the estimation of the regulatory capital charge by the banks based only on direct losses. 
Table 1 identifies the Basel II categories and definitions of direct operational losses. 
Table 1: Direct Loss Type in Operational Risk
Loss Type Contents
Write-downs Direct reduction in the value of assets due to theft, fraud, unauthorized 
activity, or market and credit losses arising as a result of operational 
events. 
Loss of recourse Payments or disbursements made to incorrect parties and not covered.
Restitution Payments to clients of principal and/or interest by way of restitution, 
or the cost of any other form of compensation paid to clients.
Legal liability Judgements, settlements, and other legal cots. 
Regulatory
and Compliance 
Taxation penalties, fines, or the direct cost of any other penalties, such 
as license revocations. 
Loss of or damage
to assets  
Direct reductions in the value of physical assets, including certificates, 
due to an accident, such as neglect, accident, fire, and earthquake. 
Source: BCBS (2001)
Indirect risk is generally opportunity costs and the losses associated with the costs of 
fixing an operational risk problem such as near-miss losses. 
Near-miss losses have been mentioned in the regulatory proposals (BCBS: 2001), and there 
are hints that they might be used to augment internal loss data in the calibration of the capital 
calculation models.  Near-miss losses are actually the estimated losses from those events that 
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could potentially occur but were successfully prevented.
4.3 Expected vs Unexpected Operational Loss
Some losses due to operational risks are expected; while some others are not. The expected 
losses (EL) are generally those that occur on regular basis, such as minor employee errors and 
minor credit card fraud. In other word, expected loss is anticipated for the next time period. 
For infrequent events, i.e. those which are extremely unlikely to occur more than once in a 




For more frequent events, expected losses E(L) depend on the form of the probability 
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Unexpected losses (UL) are those losses that generally cannot be easily foreseen, such as 
natural disasters and large scale internal fraud. For infrequent events, the following formula 
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As for expected losses, it is assumed that the number of occurrences (N) of the event in a 
time period, and the individual events impacts (I) are independent. BCBS (2001) suggests that 
the capital charge for operational risk should cover unexpected losses (UL) due to operational 
risk, and that provisions should cover expected losses (EL). This is due to the fact that many 
banking activities with a highly likely incidence of expected regular operational risk losses 
(such as fraud losses in credit card) are deducted from reported income in the particular year. 
Therefore, in 2001 BCBS proposes the calibration of capital charge for operational risk based 
on both EL and UL; a certain amount of which is to be deducted due to provisioning and loss 
deduction (rather than EL) from the minimum capital requirement. 
However, accounting rules in many countries do not provide a robust and clear approach 
to setting provisions, from example allowing provisions set only for future obligations related 
to events that have already occurred. In this sense, they may not accurately reflect the true 
scope of EL. Therefore, in the 2004 version of Accord, it was proposed to estimate the capital 
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charge as sum of EL and UL first and then subtract the EL portion in those cases when the 
bank is able to demonstrate its ability to capture the EL by its internal business practices. 
BCBS (2006a) further clarify the idea: 
“ For operational risk EL to be measured to the satisfaction of national supervisors, 
the bank’s measure of EL must be consistent with the EL plus UL capital charge 
calculated using the AMA model approved by supervisors. …Allowable offsets 
for operational risk EL must be clear capital substitutes or otherwise available to 
cover EL with a high degree of certainty over a one year time horizon. Where the 
offset is something other than provisions, its availability should be limited to those 
business lines and event types with highly predictable, routine losses. Because 
exceptional operational risk losses do not fall within EL, specific reserves for any 
such events that have already occurred will not qualify as allowable EL offsets”.
Figure 2 portrays the dimensions of operational risk, showing the catastrophic loss/
stress loss which is the loss in the excess of the upper boundary of the estimated UL such as 
99.9% value at risk.2 It requires no capital coverage; however Mori and Harada (2001), van 
den Brink (2002), and Chorafas (2004) suggest that insurance coverage may be considered.  
Figure 2: Coverage of Operational Risk
4.4 Frequency and Magnitude of Loss 
Expected losses generally refer to the losses of low severity (or magnitude) and high 
frequency. Generalising this idea, operational losses can be broadly classified into four main 
2 Value at risk is the worst loss that may occur with a given confidence level and for a given period. 
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groups: 
1. Low frequency/low severity 
2. High frequency/low severity 
3. High frequency/high severity 
4. Low frequency/high severity 
The “severity-frequency quadrant” shown in Figure 3 gives an idea on the assessment of the 
likelihood (frequency) of operational risk and the magnitude (severity) of loss. It also provides 
information on operational risk exposures across the bank. 
Figure 3: Classification of Operational Risk by Frequency and Severity
Source: Chernobai, Rachev, and Fabozzi (2007)
As clearly seen in top half of Figure 3 that if a business unit falls in the upper right hand 
quadrant (high frequency/high severity), the business has a high likelihood of operational risk and 
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argue that this is unlikely to happen; therefore it is not very useful for operational risk modelling. 
In addition, Chernobai, Rachev and Fabozzi (2007) contend that the first group (low frequency/
low severity) is not feasible as well. Consequently, the two remaining categories of operational 
losses that the financial industry needs to focus on are “high frequency/low severity” and “low 
severity/high frequency” losses. The two areas are described in the bottom half of figure 3.
The losses of high frequency/low severity are relatively unimportant for an institution 
and often can be prevented. What cause the greatest damage are the low frequency/high 
severity losses. Banks must be particularly attentive to these losses, because these cause the 
greatest financial consequences to the institution, including potential bankruptcy.3 Just a few 
of such events may result in bankruptcy or a significant decline in the value of the bank.
4.5 Hazard, Events, and Consequences Type
What makes an operational risk analysis so challenging is that because the breadth of 
operational failures comprise of hazards, events, and consequences. A modern operational 
risk management analysis, as Samad Khan (2008) argues, is based on this multidimensional 
framework, focusing on the event dimension as the starting point of analysis. 
Figure 4: Taxonomy of Operational Risks
Source: Samad-Khan (2008), with modifications. 
3 The events that incur such losses are often called the tail events. 
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• Write downs
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• Regulatory and
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   penalties and taxation)
• Loss of or damage to
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Confusion usually arises in the operational risk because of the distinction between risk 
type (or hazard type), event type, and consequence (or loss type). When banks record their 
operational loss data, it is very essential to record it separately according to event type and 
loss type, and precisely identify the risk type as well. Mori and Harada (2001), Alvarez (2002), 
and Dowd (2003) suggest that the distinction between the three is comparable to cause and the 
effect. Hazard constitutes one or more factors that increase the probability of occurrence of an 
event; event is a single incident that leads directly to one or more effects (e.g. losses); and loss 
constitutes the amount of financial damage resulting from an event.
Mori and Harada (2001) shows how operational losses would occur in a process called 
‘cause-effect’ relationship between hazard, event, and loss. Loss is effect of event while event 
is cause of loss. Yet, event is effect of hazard while hazard is cause of event. In other words, 
every loss must be associated with an event that caused the loss, while every event must 
be associated with one or multiple hazards that caused the event. Upon further analysis, it 
appears that “causes” consists of both hazards and events since hazards and events together 
cause losses (Samad-Khan, 2006: 25). Hazards are anything that should have been done, but 
were not done. In other word, nothing has necessarily materialised, while events represent 
something that happened (e.g., loss).
Operational risk hazards, events, and losses are usually associated with internal control 
weaknesses or lack of compliance with existing internal procedures as well as with the 
shariah principles (examples of hazards, events and consequences are shown in table 2). Such 
a lack of compliance can be found in all areas of an institution and is mainly caused by the 
combined actions of people, technological systems, processes, and some unpredictable events. 
It is proposed that an Islamic bank focuses on root causes as opposed to effects. When a risk 
event is formulated, the causes or originating sources could be identified, and hence, what 
consequences that would take place could also be identified. The resulting consequences if the 
risk is to be ‘accepted’, ‘avoided’, or ‘mitigated’ must also be understood. 
An analysis of operational risk management should not be thought of as disjointed 
tasks; instead, it should be viewed as a structured process in which relevant risks and control 
information are integrated as depicted in figure 4. Such a structured approach will help a 
management of an Islamic bank develop a classification based on a root cause analysis which 
can eventually be capture in the loss event database. Thus, by linking causation to relevant 
business activities, through correlation analysis for instance, the structure could then be used 
as a foundation for an effective operational risk management.
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Table 2
Examples of Causes, Events, and Losses





Faults due to Information
Technology
External Political and Financial
Uncertainties 
Inefficient Agreements with the 







Uncertainties in manufacturing 
and construction process
External partnership business 
risk
Unclear definitions in business 
activities for the partnership 








Damage to physical assets
Client, products, and business 
practices
Execution, delivery, and process 
management 
Default of keeping the promise 
to buy the commodity (in 
Murabaha contract)
Defaults of the commodity’s
delivery (Salam and Istisnaʼ 
contracts)
Failures on deliveries by the
partnership obligations (in 
Musharaka and Mudaraba
contracts)




Loss/damage to assets 
Third party losses and damages 
to assets (in ijara contract)
Loss of reputation 
Restitution 
Loss of resources 
Loss of opportunities 
Loss of market share 
Exposure to market and credit 
risks
Losses from covering business 
failures (Musharaka and 
Mudaraba business agreement)
Non-compliance with Shariah 
principles 
Source: Akkizidis and Kumar (2008: 188)
V. Operational Risks in Islamic Financial Contracts  
After identifying various aspects of operational risks in relation to Islamic banking, this 
section discusses different dimensions of operational risk in different types of Islamic 
financial contracts. As can be seen in table 3, the five dimensions of operational risk are 
Shariah compliance risk (SR), fiduciary risk (FR), people risk (PR), legal risk (LR), and 
technology risk (TR). The first three dimensions are, by nature, internally inflicted; while the 
fourth one is naturally from external source. As for technology risk (TR); it can originate from 
either internal or external operational failures. 
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Table 3. 
The Dimensions of Operational Risk in Islamic Financial Contracts













Murabaha • Exchange of money 
and commodity 
needs to be ensured
• In the event of late 
payment, penalty 
must be avoided as 
it will tantamount to 
riba. 
Inability to meet 
the specified 
product stipulated 
in the contract 







be sold must 





Salam • Final payment of 
monetary rewards
must be concluded 
in advance 
• Penalty clause is 
illegitimate in the 
event of seller’s 
default in delivering 
the goods 
• In parallel Salam, 
execution of second 
Salam contract is 
not contingent on 
the settlement of the 
first Salam contract
• Inability to meet 
the specified 
product 
stipulated in the 
contract.
• Delivery of 
inferior goods 
can not be 
accepted 
Mismatch in the 
commodity’s 
specification due 
to inability of 
seller to provide 
the exact product 
mentioned in the 
contract.
Incompatibility 
of the new 
accounting 
software
Goods must be 
delivered when it 
is due, as agreed 





agreed in the 
contract
Istisnaʼ • Should not be used 
as a legal device; 
e.g. the party 
ordering the product 
to be produced is 
the manufacturer 
himself
• In parallel Istisna’, 
contracts should be 
separated to avoid 
two sales in one deal 
Need to ensure the 
quality standards 
of the products
Inability to deliver 
the product on 
time
Incompatibility 














agreed in the 
contract
Ijara • Need to ensure
that leased asset is 
used in a Shariah 
compliant manner
• In Ijarah Muntahia 
Bittamleek, an 
option to purchase 
can not be enforced.
Major 
maintenance of 
the leased asset is 
the responsibility 
of the banks or 
any party acting 
as lessor. 
Lessor needs to 
understand that 
in the event of 
payment delay, 
rental due can 










to repossess the 
asset in case 
of default or 




the leased assets 
specified in the 
contract due to 
external security 
breaches
Musharakah Profit allocation is 












of the new 
accounting 
software
A mixture of 
shares in one 
entity may lead 
to legal risk if the 
regulation does 
not facilitate such 
action
Losses of 
information on the 
projects specified 
in the contract 
due to external 
security breaches
Mudarabah Profit allocation is 
based on actual profit, 
not expected profit
Inadequate 


















information on the 
projects specified 
in the contract 
due to external 
security breaches
Source: Author’s own  
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5.1 Murabahah 
Murabahah is “selling a commodity as per the purchasing price with a defined and agreed 
profit mark-up” (AAOIFI, 2005). This mark-up may be a percentage of the selling price 
or a lump sum. Moreover, according to AAOIFI standard (2005), this transaction may 
be concluded either without a prior promise to buy, in which case it is called ordinary 
Murabahah, or with a prior promise to buy submitted by a person interested in acquiring 
goods through the institution, in which it is called a “banking Murabahah”, i.e. Murabahah 
to the purchase orderer. This transaction is one of the trust-based contracts that depends on 
transparency as to the actual purchasing price or cost price in addition to common expenses.  
Murabahah is the most popular contract in terms of its use, since most of Islamic 
commercial banks operating worldwide rely on this contract in generating income. Different 
dimensions of operational risk which can arise in murabahah transaction are as follows: 
● Shariah compliance risk (SR); may arise if the Islamic banks give money, instead 
of commodity, which will then result in the exchange of money and money. This 
is prohibited in Shariah, since the exchange of money with money, plus additional 
amount above the principal and paid in different time will tantamount to Riba. 
AAOIFI Shariah standard (2005) also requires Islamic banks to own, legally, the 
commodity before they sell it to the customers. It is important to note that the 
sequence of the contract is very central in Murabahah transaction. Inability or failure 
to conform with the sequence and Shariah requirement will result in the transaction 
to be deemed illegitimate.   
●	 Fiduciary risk (FR); this risk arises due to the inability to meet the specified 
commodity stipulated in the contract. 
●	 People risk (PR); the risk can result from two sides, seller as well as buyer. PR from 
the seller side occurs if Islamic banks fail to deliver the specified product agreed in 
the contract on due date, while PR from the buyer side takes place when the buyers 
does not keep their promise to buy the commodity. This can happen in the binding 
Murabahah contract.
●	 Legal risk (LR); profit originated from Murabahah can not be equated with interest, 
although it looks similar. The main difference is because the resulting profit is 
tied with the underlying commodity. This might create legal problem as in certain 
countries, the regulators only give limitation on interest rate, not profit rate. Hence, 
the absence of so called ‘profit rate cap’ has the potential to crate legal problems 
if there is any dispute. Another potential problem can occur at the contract signing 
stage, since the contract requires the Islamic bank to purchase the asset first before 
selling it to the customer; the bank needs to ensure that the legal implications of the 
contract properly match the commercial intent of the transactions.
39
Identifying Operational Risk Exposures in Islamic Banking
●	 Technology risk (TR); may result from an incompatibility of the new accounting 
software or an external system failure. 
 
5.2 Salam and Parallel Salam  
AAOIFI Shariah standards (2005) define Salam as a transaction of the purchase of a 
commodity for the deferred delivery in exchange for immediate payment. It is a type of 
sale in which the price, known as the Salam capital, is paid at the time of contracting while 
the delivery of the item to be sold, know as al-Muslam Fihi (the subject matter of a Salam 
contract), is deferred. The seller and the buyer are known as al-Muslam Ilaihi and al-Muslam 
or Rabb al-Salam respectively. Salam is also known as Salaf. Parallel Salam occurs when 
the seller enters into another separate Salam contract with a third party to acquire goods, 
the specification of which corresponds to that of the commodity specified in the first Salam 
contract (AAOIFI, 2005).
●	 Shariah compliance risk (SR); one of the very central conditions in Salam contract 
is that the payment of Salam capital must be paid full in advance. If payment is 
delayed, the transaction is not called Salam (AAOIFI, 2005: 172). Any delay in 
payment of the capital and dispersal of the parties renders the transaction a sale of 
debt for debt, which is prohibited, and the scholars agreed on its prohibition (AAOIFI, 
2005: 172). Another aspect, which might lead to SR may also occur in parallel 
Salam; this will take place if the execution of the second Salam contract is contingent 
on the execution of the first Salam contract. Penalty clause is also not allowed, in 
the event of a seller’s default in delivering the good. The basis for not allowing 
penalty in Salam is because al-Muslam Fihi (the subject matter of a Salam contract) 
is considered to be a debt; hence it is not permitted to stipulate payment in excess of 
the principal amounts of debt (AAOIFI, 2005: 173).   
●	 Fiduciary risk (FR); Salam is generally associated with the agricultural sector. The 
buyer must either rejects goods of an inferior quality to that specified in the contract, 
or accept them at the original price. In the latter case, the goods would have to be 
sold at a discount (unless the customer under a parallel Salam agreed to accept the 
goods at the originally agreed price).
●	 People risk (PR); can arise due to a seller’s default in delivering the commodity 
or due to the commodity’s specification mismatching. Financial institutions may 
minimise such type of operational risks by asking from the seller guarantees that they 
are following a quality management system or following any standard system, or by 
asking for references on past promises on Salam contract or by collateralising their 
losses via insurance policies.
●	 Legal risk (LR); Islamic banks may face legal risk if the goods can not be delivered 
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at the specified time (unless the customer under parallel Salam agrees to modify the 
delivery date).
●	 Technology risk (TR); may result from an incompatibility of the new accounting 
software or the system fails to specify precisely the commodities agreed in the 
contract.   
5.3 Istisna’ and Parallel Istisna’
Istisna’ is another type of forward contract, but the role of an Islamic bank as a financial 
intermediary differs from that in a Salam contract. In this case, the bank contracts to supply 
a constructed asset (such as a building or a ship) for a customer. In turn, the bank enters into 
a parallel Istisna’ with a sub-contractor in order to have the asset constructed. Its reliance on 
the parallel Istisnaʼ counterparty (the sub-contractor) exposes it to various operational risks, 
which need to be managed by a combination of legal precautions, due diligence in choosing 
sub-contractors, and technical management by appropriately qualified staff or consultants of 
the execution of the contract by the sub-contractor. Islamic banks that specialise in Istisna’ 
financing may have an engineering department. Risks may include the following: 
●	 Shariah compliance risk (SR); could arise if Istisnaʼ is being used as a legal device 
for mere interest based financing. For instance, an institution buys items from the 
contractor on a cash payment basis and sells them back to the manufacturer on a 
deferred payment basis at a higher price; or where the party ordering the subject 
matter to be produced is the manufacturer himself; or where one third or more of the 
facility in which the subject matter will be produced belongs to the customer. All 
the circumstances mentioned above would make the deal an interest based financing 
deal in which the subject matter never genuinely changes hands, even if the deal 
won through competitive bidding. This rule is intended to avoid sale and buy back 
transactions (Bay al-Inah). In parallel Istisna’, the separation of contracts is a must, 
hence this is not an instance of two sales in one deal, ehich is prohibited.   
●	 Fiduciary risk (FR); the sub-contractor may fail to meet quality standards or other 
requirements of the specification, as agreed with the costumer under the Istisna’ 
contract. 
●	 People Risk (PR); this may arise if the Islamic bank may be unable to deliver the 
asset on time, owing to time overruns by the sub-contractor under the parallel 
Istisna’, and may thus face penalties for late completion.
●	 Legal risk (LR); Islamic banks may face legal risk if no agreement is reached with 
the sub-contractor and the customer either for remedying the defects or for reducing 
the contract price.
●	 Technology risk (TR); may result from an incompatibility of the new accounting 
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software or the system fails to specify precisely the commodities that would be 
produced in the contract.   
5.4. Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek
In simple terms, an Ijarah contract is an operating lease, whereas Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek 
is a lease to purchase. While operational risk exposures during the purchase and holding of the 
assets may be similar to those in case of Murabahah, other operational risk aspects include 
the following:  
●	 Shariah compliance risk (SR); the Islamic banks need to ensure that the asset will be 
used in a Shariah compliant manner. Otherwise, it is exposed to non-recognition of 
the lease income as non-permissible. 
●	 Fiduciary risk (FR); major maintenance is the responsibility of an Islamic bank as a 
lessor, as directed by AAOIFI Shariah standards (2005: 154). In addition to that, it 
is the duty of the lessor to ensure that the usufruct is intact, and this is not possible 
unless the asset is maintained and kept safe so that the lessor may be entitled to 
the rentals in consideration for the usufruct. Thus, deficiencies in maintaining such 
responsibility can be deemed to be sources of FR in Ijarah contract.   
●	 People risk (PR); lessor is not allowed to increase the rental due, in case of 
delay of payment by the lesse, this is what AAOIFI (2005) clearly exemplifies. 
Misunderstanding of this principle by the staff is a source of losses caused by PR, 
because the income generated from this, is not permissible from Shariah point of 
view.
●	 Legal risk (LR); the Islamic bank may be exposed to legal risk in respect of the 
enforcement of its contractual right to repossess the asset in case of default or 
misconduct by the lessee. This may be the case particularly when the asset is a house 
or apartment that is the lessee’s home, and the lessee enjoys protection as a tenant. 
●	 Technology risk (TR); may occur due to an incompatibility of the new accounting 
software or losses of information on the leased assets due to external security 
breaches. 
5.5 Musharakah
Musharakah is a profit and loss sharing partnership contract. The Islamic bank may enter into 
a Musharakah with a customer for the purpose of providing a Shariah compliant financing 
facility to the customer on a profit and loss sharing basis. The customer will normally be the 
managing partner in the venture, but the bank may participate in the management and thus 
be able to monitor the use of the funds more closely. Typically, a diminishing Musharakah 
will be used for this purpose, and the customer will progressively purchase the bank’s share 
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of the venture. Operational risks that may be associated with Musharakah investments are as 
follows:  
●	 Shariah compliance risk (SR); the source of SR may arise due to the final allocation 
of profit taking place based on expected profit. AAOIFI (2005: 205) commands that 
it is necessary that the allocation of profit is done on the basis of actual profit earned 
through actual or constructive valuation of the sold assets. 
●	 Fiduciary risk (FR); any misconduct or negligence of the partners are the sources 
of FR. This can happen in the absence of adequate monitoring of the financial 
performance of the venture. 
●	 People risk (PR); lack of appropriate technical expertise can be a cause of failure in a 
new business activity.
●	 Legal risk (LR); an Islamic bank which enters into Musharakah contract needs to 
acquire some shares from separate legal entity that undertake Shariah compliant 
activities. A mixture of shares in one entity may lead to legal risk if the regulation 
does not allow doing such action.
●	 Technology risk (TR); may occur due to an incompatibility of the new accounting 
software or losses of the precise information on projects undertaken due to external 
security breaches.
5.6 Mudarabah 
Mudarabah is a profit sharing and loss bearing contract under which the financier (Rab 
al Mal) entrusts his funds to an entrepreneur (Mudarib). The exposure of operational risk in 
Mudarabah is somewhat similar to that of Musharakah. However, since this type of contract 
may be used on the assets side of the balance sheet, as well as being used on the funding side 
for mobilising investment accounts, the operational risk is first analysed from the assets-side 
perspective and then from the funding side perspective (which is related to fiduciary risk) 
5.6.1 Asset-side Mudarabah
Contractually, an Islamic bank has no control over the management of the business financed 
through this mode, the entrepreneur having complete freedom to run the enterprise according 
to his best judge judgement. The bank is contractually entitled only to share with the 
entrepreneur the profits generated by the venture according to the contractually agreed profit 
sharing ratio. The entrepreneur as Mudarib does not share in any losses which are borne 
entirely by the Rab al Mal. The Mudarib has an obligation to act in a fiduciary capacity as the 
manager of the bank’s funds, but the situation gives rise to moral hazard especially if there 
is information asymmetry—that is, the bank does not receive regular and reliable financial 
reports on the performance of the Mudarib. Hence, in addition to due diligence before 
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advancing the funds, the bank needs to take precautions against problems of information 
asymmetry during the period of investment.    
5.6.2 Funding-side Mudarabah
Profit-sharing (and loss bearing) investment accounts are a Shariah compliant alternative 
to conventional interest-bearing deposit account. Since a Mudarabah contract is employed 
between the Islamic bank and its investment account holders, the investment account holders 
(IAHs) share the profits and bear all losses without having any control or rights of governance 
over the Islamic bank. In return, the Islamic bank has fiduciary responsibilities in managing 
the IAHs’ funds. The IAHs typically expect returns on their funds that are comparable to the 
returns paid by competitors (both other Islamic banks and conventional institutions), but they 
also expect the Islamic bank to comply with Shariah rules and principles at all times. If the 
Islamic bank is seen to be deficient in its Shariah compliance, it is exposed to the risk of IAHs 
withdrawing their funds and, in serious cases, of being accused of misconduct and negligence. 
In the latter case, the funds of the IAHs may be considered to be a liability of the Islamic 
bank, thus jeopardising its solvency.              
 
VI. Capital Requirement for Operational Risks 
Prior to discussing the measurement of capital requirement for operational risks in Islamic 
banks, it is important to understand why banks should have adequate capital. For this 
reason, the first part of this section attempts to elucidate the rational behind capital adequacy 
requirement. This also explains, briefly, the relationship between bank capitalisation and risk 
taking behaviour. Following to the discussion in the first part, the subsequent parts, second 
and third, discuss the measurement of capital attribution for operational risks and operational 
risk capital charge in Islamic banks respectively. 
6.1 Why Do Banks Need to Hold Capital?
Traditionally, capital adequacy requirements have been imposed to ensure solvency. 
Following Maisel (1979, 1981) and Merton (1979), a bank can be declared ‘insolvent’ or 
‘bankrupt’ when the market value of the bank liabilities to depositors, computed by assuming 
that the bank’s obligations to depositors would be fully met, exceeds the market value of the 
bank assets reduced by the costs of liquidation. In other words, negative net worth (based 
on market values) implies insolvency. For this reason banks generally attempt to boost 
their risk-based capital ratios by means of; (a) increasing the measures of regulatory capital 
appearing in the numerators of leverage ratio, or (b) decreasing the regulatory measures 
of total risk appearing in the denominators (e.g., total risk-weighted assets). Jones (2000) 
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suggests that in the short run, most banks have tended to react to capital pressures in the ways 
broadly envisioned by the framers of the Accord. That is, by increasing their capacity to 
absorb unexpected losses through increased earnings retentions or new capital issues, and by 
lowering their assumed risks through reductions in loans and other footings. 
The relationship between banks’ capitalisations and risk taking behaviours is one of the 
central issues in the banking literature because of the potential implications for regulatory 
policies. The minimum capital requirement which currently constitutes the core regulatory 
instrument for the banking industry is based on the premise that increased capital enhances 
bank safety (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2007). As also discussed in Jeitschko and Jeung (2005), 
however, this premise may not hold under some relevant circumstances. Indeed, if increased 
capital induces a bank to increase asset risk (asset substitution effect of capital), and this effect 
supersede the buffer effect of capital (larger capital absorbs more risk), then it is possible that 
a more highly capitalised bank has a higher probability of failure. This risk taking behaviour 
of banks related to capitalisation explains why banks often experience rapid, large declines 
in their capital to asset ratio (CAR), and are classified by regulators from well capitalised 
to troubled banks in as little as a single reporting period. The implication of this positive 
relationship between risk taking and capitalisation is that capital regulation alone may not be 
adequate to guarantee the soundness of the banking business.
6.2 Measurement of Operational Risk based Capital
Basel II implemented an additional add-on to capital for operational risk. Prior to this 
proposal, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) had argued that operational 
risk exposures of banks were adequately taken care of by the 8 percent credit risk-adjusted 
ratio. But increased visibility of operational risks in recent years has induced regulators to 
propose a separate capital requirement for credit and operational risks. BCBS now believes 
that operational risks are sufficiently important for banks to devote resources to quantify such 
risks and to incorporate them separately into their assessment of their capital adequacy. In the 
2001 and 2003 Consultative Documents the Basel Committee outlined three specific methods 
by which banks can calculate capital to protect against operational risk: the Basic Indicator 
Approach (BIA), the Standardised Approach (SA), and the Advanced Measurement Approach 
(AMA). 
The Basic Indicator Approach is structured so that banks, on average, will hold 12 
percent of their total regulatory capital for operational risk. This 12 percent target was based 
on a widespread survey conducted internationally of current practices by large banks.4 To 
4 Research has found that the amount of capital held for operational risk according to these models will 
often exceed capital held for market risk and that the largest banks could choose to allocate several billion 
dollars in capital to operational risk. See (De Fontnouvelle et al., 2006).  
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achieve this target, the Basic Indicator Approach focuses on the gross income of the bank, that 
is, its net profits. This equals a bank’s net interest income plus net non-interest income: 
restIncomenetNonIntetIncomenetIntereseGrossIncom  
According to BCBS calculations, a bank that holds a fraction (α) of its gross income 
for operational risk capital, where alpha (α) is set at 15 percent, will generate enough capital 
for operational risk such that this amount will be 12 percent of its regulatory capital holdings 
against all risks (i.e., credit, market, and operational risks). For example, under the Basic 
Indicator Approach: 
eGrossIncomlCapitalOperationa u D 
eGrossIncom. u 15 
The problem with the Basic Indicator Approach is that it is too aggregative, or ‘top-
down’, and does not differentiate at all among different areas in which operational risks may 
differ (e.g., Payment and Settlement may have a very different operational risk profile from 
Retail	Brokerage).	A	second	issue	is	 that	α	 implies	operational	risk	that	 is	proportional	 to	
gross income. This ignores, according to Saunders and Cornett (2008), possible economies of 
scale	effects	that	would	make	this	relationship	nonlinear	(non-proportional);	that	is,	α	might	
fall as bank profits and/or size grows.  
In an attempt to provide a finer differentiation of operational risks in a bank across 
different activity lines while still retaining a basically top-down approach, the BCBS offers 
a second method for operational capital calculation. The second method, the Standardised 
Approach, divides activities into eight major business units and lines. Within each business 
line, there is a specified broad indicator (defined as beta, β) that reflects the scale or volume 
of a bank’s activities in that area. The indicator relates to the gross income reported for a 
particular line of business. It serves as a rough proxy for the amount of operational risk 
within each of these lines. A capital charge is calculated by multiplying the β for each line 
by the indicator assigned to the line and then summing these components. The β reflects the 
importance of each activity in the average bank. The β is set by regulators and is calculated 
from average industry figures from a selected sample of banks. 
Suppose gross income from the Corporate Finance line of business (the activity 
indicator) is £30 million and the industry β for Corporate Finance is 18 percent. Then, the 
regulatory capital charge for this line for this year is: 
CapitalCorporate Finance = β × Gross Income from the Corporate Finance line business for the bank
= 18% × £30 million 
= £5,400,000
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The total capital charge is calculated as the three-year average of the simple summation 
of the regulatory capital charge across each of the eight business lines.5
The third method, the Advanced Measurement Approach, allows individual banks to 
rely on internal data for regulatory capital purposes subject to supervisory approval. Under 
the Advanced Measurement Approach, supervisors require the bank to calculate its regulatory 
capital requirement as the sum of the expected loss (EL) and unexpected loss (UL) for each 
event type. Internally generated operational risk measures used for regulatory capital purposes 
must be based on a minimum three year observation period of internal loss data, whether the 
internal loss data are used directly to build the loss measure or to validate it. A bank’s internal 
loss data must be comprehensive in that the data capture all material activities and exposures 
from all appropriate subsystems and geographic locations. Risk measures for different 
operational risk estimates are added for purposes of calculating the regulatory minimum 
capital requirement.  
6.3 Operational Risk Capital Charge in Islamic Banks
The proposed measurement of capital to cater for operational risk in Islamic banks is also 
adopting the methods set by BCBS. As IFSB (2005b: 17) mentions in its standards that the 
calculation of operational risk based capital in Islamic banks “may be based on either the 
Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach as set out in Basel II”.  However, 
there is dissimilarity as regards with the use of the Standardised Approach (SA), since IFSB 
(2005b) views that Islamic banks have different structure of business lines. Hence, at the 
present stage, the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) can be adopted by Islamic banks. BIA 
requires the setting aside of a fixed percentage of average annual gross income over the 
previous three years. 
Problems of measurement is likely to arise due to lack of data, hence the extent of losses 
arising from non-compliance with Shariah rules can not be ascertained. Therefore, IFSB 
(2005b: 18) does not require Islamic banks to set aside any additional amount over and above 
the 15% of average annual gross income over the preceding three years for operational risk. 
Furthermore, in determining risk weights for operational risk, IFSB (2005b: 18) recommends 
the exclusion of the share of profit sharing investment account holders from gross income, 
which is necessary to adjust this, since Islamic banks share profits with their depositor-
investors (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). 
5 The Basel’s Committee’s Loss Data Collection Exercise for Operational Risk (March 2003), based 
on data provided by 89 banks from 19 countries, revealed that about 61 percent of operational loss events 
occurred in the retail area, with an average loss of $79,300. Also, only 0.9 percent of operational loss events 
occurred in the corporate finance area, but with an average loss of $646,600.
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VII. Conclusion
Operational risk is a recent addition to the list of risks faced by financial institutions. The 
management of operational risk in Islamic banks is similar to that in conventional banks 
but includes several additional elements. In addition, due to the unique features of their 
financial contracts, operational risk in Islamic banks can be substantially different from what 
is exposed to the conventional ones. The relative complexity of contracts, combined with the 
fiduciary obligations of Islamic banks, imply that for Islamic banks, operational risk is a very 
important consideration. More importantly, Shariah compliance risk as part of operational 
risk is paramount to Islamic banks, which means Islamic banks must ensure, at all times, that 
all activities and products are in conformity with Shariah principles. It is, then, apparent that 
the dimension of operational risk exposure in Islamic banks is more sophisticated than in 
conventional banks.
Operational risk is now recognised as a type of risk which can contribute to significant 
losses in all financial institutions.  For this reason, various techniques being applied in banks 
today in order to measure and manage operational risk. The methods set out by BCBS help 
the Islamic banks determine their capital in order to absorb operational losses. However, 
due to the small size of Islamic banks compared to the overall financial industry, the more 
advanced methods in the calculation of operational risk based capital is still not feasible to be 
implemented. The absence of significant amount of loss data is also one of the problems that 
hinder Islamic banks to implement more sophisticated methods. Given the rapid growth of 
Islamic financial industry, it is expected that lack of data will not be the main issue in the near 
future. 
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